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Damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) impairs concern for other people, as reflected in the dysfunctional real-life social
behavior of patients with such damage, as well as their abnormal performances on tasks ranging from moral judgment to economic
games. Despite these convergent data, we lack a formal model of how, and to what degree, VMPFC lesions affect an individual’s social
decision-making. Here we provide a quantification of these effects using a formal economic model of choice that incorporates terms for
the disutility of unequal payoffs, with parameters that index behaviors normally evoked by guilt and envy. Six patients with focal VMPFC
lesions participated in a battery of economic games that measured concern about payoffs to themselves and to others: dictator, ultima-
tum, and trust games. We analyzed each task individually, but also derived estimates of the guilt and envy parameters from aggregate
behavior across all of the tasks. Compared with control subjects, the patients donated significantly less and were less trustworthy, and
overall ourmodel found a significant insensitivity to guilt. Despite these abnormalities, the patients had normal expectations aboutwhat
other people would do, and they also did not simply generate behavior that was more noisy. Instead, the findings argue for a specific
insensitivity to guilt, an abnormality that we suggest characterizes a key contribution made by the VMPFC to social behavior.
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Introduction
How people anticipate and react to the fortunes of others is a
central issue in all social sciences, but its psychological and neu-
robiological underpinnings are not well understood. Experimen-
tal economists and psychologists have studied how people value
monetary payoffs (gains or losses) to others, using simple eco-
nomic games designed to measure deviations from pure self-
interest in monetary terms. The results of these studies have led to
mathematical descriptions of “social preference”: models that
describe how people integrate the monetary outcomes they
themselves receive, with those of other players (Fehr and
Schmidt, 2001; Camerer and Fehr, 2006).
A parallel line of research in patients with focal brain lesions
has described qualitative patterns of altered real-life social behav-
ior, and made inferences about the impaired social emotions that
underlie it. Damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC), in particular, is known to impair real-world social
functioning, decision-making, and planning (Damasio, 1994;
Anderson et al., 1999, 2006; Bechara et al., 2000; Beer et al., 2003),
consistent with studies that have implicated the VMPFC in pro-
cessing emotional value attributed to rewards and punishments
(Fuster, 1989; Bechara et al., 1997; Rogers et al., 1999; Breiter et
al., 2001; Critchley et al., 2001; Kringelbach, 2005).
Whereas some of these studies have investigated impairments
in decision-making, the research on the abnormal social behav-
iors exhibited by VMPFC patients has been largely based on qual-
itative observation, interviews with family members, or non-
choice data (Ackerly and Benton, 1947; Damasio, 1994;
Anderson et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). These data
and observations suggest the hypothesis that the abnormal social
behaviors following damage to the VMPFC may arise, at least in
part, from impairments to social emotions, particularly guilt and
envy (Shin et al., 2000; Damasio, 2003; Koenigs and Tranel, 2007;
Koenigs et al., 2007). However, none of the previous studies have
used formal choice models to isolate and quantify behaviors that
would be elicited by these social emotions. Doing so would help
provide a general model of how VMPFC patients behave in social
tasks and help to distinguish between several competing hypoth-
eses about the roles of VMPFC in social behavior.
To address this hypothesis, we evaluated VMPFC lesion pa-
tients (Fig. 1) and comparison subjects on three types of games
that are commonly used to measure social preferences in experi-
mental economics: dictator, ultimatum and trust games (Cam-
erer, 2003). We used a stochastic model of choice from econom-
ics that includes numerical measures of envy () and guilt (),
defined as the relative weights on the difference in earnings when
Received Oct. 21, 2008; revised Dec. 22, 2008; accepted Jan. 8, 2009.
This workwas supported by a program project grant to A. R. Damasio from the National Institute of Neurological
Disorders andStroke andbygrants from theNational Institute ofMental Health (R.A.), theNational Institute onDrug
Abuse (D.T.), the National Science Foundation (R.A. and C.F.C.), and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (R.A.
and C.F.C.). Hanna Damasio and Jessica Wisnowski (Dornsife Cognitive Neuroscience Imaging Center, University of
Southern California) conducted the neuroanatomical analysis of the patients and provided the illustration of the
VMPFC group. We thank all participants for their participation in the experiments, Amanda Hornaday, Kodi Scheer,
and Ruth Henson for help with scheduling and testing the subjects, Ming Hsu for suggestions with analysis and
comments on this manuscript, Michael Koenigs for comments on this manuscript, and Jonathan Leland for general
comments.
The authors declare no competing financial interests.
Correspondence should be addressed to RalphAdolphs, Division of theHumanities and Social Sciences, California
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125. E-mail: radolphs@caltech.edu.
DOI:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5086-08.2009
Copyright © 2009 Society for Neuroscience 0270-6474/09/292188-05$15.00/0
2188 • The Journal of Neuroscience, February 18, 2009 • 29(7):2188–2192
others earn more (envy) or less (guilt) than oneself (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999). Using this model, we were able to analyze the
pooled data from all three types of games to infer subject-specific
social preference parameters and compare them across groups,
expecting to see that the VMPFC lesion patients would exhibit
less guilt and more envy than the comparison subjects, based on
previous results which have shown that VMPFC lesion patients
reject unfair ultimatum offers and behaviorally appear to show
substantially diminished guilt (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; Koe-
nigs et al., 2007).
Materials andMethods
Participants. We tested six patients with focal
bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, encompassing both anterior and poste-
rior sectors (Fig. 1), who had known impair-
ments in real-life social behavior, and in partic-
ular in social emotions (Damasio, 2003;
Koenigs et al., 2007), but were otherwise com-
parable in age, education, IQ and basic cogni-
tive functioning to the comparison groups. Our
VMPFC patients, as well as 20 brain-damaged
comparisons with focal, stable lesions of the
brain (BDC; with damage in diverse cortical re-
gions but excluding the VMPFC) were re-
cruited from the Cognitive Neuroscience Pa-
tient Registry at the University of Iowa from a
larger sample (in particular, for anatomical
specificity, we excluded several potential
VMPFC patients because their lesions were too
large and encompassed too many other sectors
of the prefrontal cortex). A third comparison
group consisted of 16 healthy participants (NC)
of similar age and IQ (see supplemental Table 1,
available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material). All six VMPFC patients had partici-
pated in previous published studies that exam-
ined this region of the brain (Hsu et al., 2005;
Koenigs et al., 2007), and had given informed
consent to participate in our study.
Procedure. In a one-shot dictator game, each
subject was asked to divide 50 points between
him or herself and an anonymous stranger. In
the context of our economic model, offering
0 points is an example of guilt, the preference
for giving up some of one’s own payoffs to
achieve a more equal division. In a one-shot
ultimatum game, shares of 50 points were again
allocated, but the recipient of the offer could
accept it (in which case both players earn their
respective shares) or reject it (in which case nei-
ther player gets anything). Subjects played the
ultimatum game twice, once as the proposer
where they were asked how much they would
offer, and once as the recipient where they were
asked for the minimum amount they would de-
mand. In the context of our economic model,
rejecting an offer is an example of envy, the
preference for getting nothing (but an equal
share) over accepting an uneven division.
We next assessed trust and trustworthiness
using binary-choice “trust” games. In these
games, the first player (investor) chooses to ei-
ther End the game, in which case both players
earn 20 points, or to Trust. If Trust is chosen,
the second player (trustee) chooses to either Re-
pay or Betray. Three versions of the trust game
varied the temptation payoff T  45, T  60,
and T  100. A fourth game used T  60 and
changed the Repay payoffs to R  (30,30). Each subject played all four
versions twice, once as the investor and once as the trustee. Variation in
the willingness to Trust and Betray for various Repay/Betray payoff com-
binations allows us to gauge the relative weights one puts on one’s own
payoffs and on equality. For more details on these games, see supplemen-
tal Figure 1 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
All subjects were tested individually at the University of Iowa, and told
that they were playing against another person at Caltech with whom the
experimenter was in contact over the phone. During the tasks, the exper-
imenter spoke with the other person on the phone and described the
Figure1. Neuroanatomyof theVMPFC subjects. The overlap density of lesions from the six VMPFC subjects is shown in color on
coronal slices and three-dimensionally rendered views of a brain. Each patient’s lesion was manually transferred, slice-by-slice,
onto a common reference brain to visualize their overlaps (Frank et al., 1997). The red regions denotemaximal overlap among the
VMPFC subjects; all shareddamage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex including ventromedial polar frontal cortex. HannaDamasio
and Jessica Wisnowski (Dornsife Cognitive Neuroscience Imaging Center, University of Southern California) conducted the neu-
roanatomical analysis and provided the images. See supplemental Methods (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material) for more information on lesion location.
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subject’s decisions as well as asked for the other
player’s decision (except for the dictator game).
No other information was provided about the
other player (subjects did not actually speak
with the other player, nor was any information
communicated about the other player’s emo-
tional reactions). Subjects were told that in ev-
ery game, including the four versions of the
trust game, they were interacting with a differ-
ent person. The behavioral patterns we saw in
comparison subjects using this procedure were
comparable to those in many other experi-
ments in which subjects played with other peo-
ple for monetary rewards.
All games were played according to a fixed
strategy, but this was not known to the subjects.
Every subject participated first in the dictator
game, then the ultimatum game, and finally the
trust games [in fixed order:T 60,T 45,T
100, and last T  60 with Repay  (30,30)].
Subjects played for points throughout and were
told that these would be converted to real
money at the end of the experiment; they were not told of the conversion
formula and every subject was given $20 at the end.
Modeling choice and guilt/envy.We used a model of economic choice in
which players weigh their own payoffs against the (squared) deviations
between their payoffs and what others get (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). The coefficients
on the squared deviations are the weights on guilt and envy compared
with one’s own earnings, depending on whether the deviations are above
or below an equal share, respectively. Denote player 1’s payoff from a
particular game as x1 and player 2’s payoff as x2. Then the model formal-
izes player 1’s overall utility as follows: u1(x1, x2) x1 [Min{x1/(x1
x2) 1⁄2, 0}]
2  [Max{x1/(x1 x2) 1⁄2, 0}]
2.
The weights  and  measure how much people dislike earning an
unfair payoff share which deviates from 1⁄2, relative to earning more
money (higher x1). We consider two cases, one where the deviations are
below equality, in which case the relevant parameter is envy (), and one
where the deviations are above equality, in which case the relevant pa-
rameter is guilt (). A weight of   0 corresponds to pure selfishness
with no guilt; a person with  0 is indifferent about the other player’s
payoffs and will simply maximize his own payoffs. A higher  corre-
sponds to a greater willingness to sacrifice one’s own payoffs to create
more equal payoffs for everyone. Similarly, a weight of 0 corresponds
to pure self-interested behavior with no envy of other players’ payoffs. A
high  signifies a greater willingness to sacrifice one’s own payoffs just to
ensure that others will not earn higher payoffs.
We combined this model of fairness preference with a logistic model of
stochastic choice (Luce, 1959; Hsu et al., 2005). In our games, players
chose between actions which create two different payoff allocations X
(x1, x2) and Y ( y1, y2). The utilities of these allocations are given by the
formula above, yielding u(X) and u(Y). We assume choices are imper-
fectly sensitive to these differences in utility, according to the “softmax”
or logit function: P(XY ) 1/(1 e [u(Y)  u(X)]).
In this “noisy” decision making model, P(XY ) is the probability that
X is chosen over Y, and  is a parameter that calibrates how responsive a
player’s choices are to differences in utility. A  0 corresponds to pure
random choice; higher values of  mean subjects are more responsive to
utility differences and more often pick the option that yields a higher
utility.
The analysis of guilty decision-making was done using the dictator
offer, the ultimatum offer and the trustee decisions in the trust games.
The analysis of envious decision-making was done using the investor
decisions in the trust games. One problem with using the trust and ulti-
matum games is the confound between a subject’s own sense of guilt or
envy and his perception of how fair-minded others are. It is therefore
necessary to estimate the envy and guilt parameters  and , along with
expectation parameters for the envy and guilt weights of others, denoted
E() and E().
Parameter estimation was done using maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) (see supplemental Methods, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material). An infeasibly large dataset would be required to
estimate all parameters separately for each subject; given our primary
interest in the social preference parameters and not the noise parameters,
we estimated the two separate values at the group level (one each for the
analyses of the decisions involving guilt, one each for the analyses of the
decisions involving envy), and then were able to estimate the other pa-
rameters [, , E(), and E()] for each subject individually.
Results
Figure 2 summarizes the offers and demands made in the dictator
and ultimatum games, out of 50 points. The data produced by
comparison subjects were comparable to those in many other
normal populations (Camerer, 2003). Two patterns were signif-
icant: First, VMPFC patients gave less in the dictator games (only
4.7 of 50, compared with 12 and 18 for the comparison groups),
consistent with the hypothesis that they would exhibit less guilt.
Second, in the ultimatum game we did not see significant differ-
ences in the offers or demands, but a striking difference between
the groups was that the gap between ultimatum offers and de-
mands was zero for all but one of the VMPFC patients (and only
a5 point difference for that one). In contrast, comparison sub-
jects generally offered more than they demanded [as in most
other studies (Camerer, 2003)]. This result is also consistent with
our hypothesis about guilt, since the gap between ultimatum of-
fers and demands is an approximate measure for how much more
a subject is willing to offer above what he/she believes is the
minimum acceptable to the other player.
Table 1 shows the percentage of Trust and Repay choices in
the trust games. Looking at the investor behavior, the VMPFC
group chose to trust less often than the BDC group in all 4 com-
binations, and less than the NC group in 3 of 4 combinations
(trusting equally in one case). In the trustee role, the VMPFC
group repaid less often than the control groups across the board
but also seemed to generally reduce their Repay rates as the in-
centives to Betray increased.
Because each subject played all four trust games, we were able
to combine their choices to form a composite index of trust (the
percentage of games in which they chose Trust) and trustworthi-
ness (the percentage of games in which they chose Repay), de-
noted “Avg” in Table 1. Using this measure, the VMPFC patients
were significantly less trustworthy than the NC group. The BDC
group was not significantly different from the VMPFC or NC
Figure2. Behavioral results ondictator andultimatumgames (with SEbars).A,Meannumber of points (out of 50) given to the
other player in the dictator game. VMPFC lesion patients gave significantly less than the control groups. One NC subject did not
play the dictator game.B, Mean number of points (out of 50) offered in the proposer role of the ultimatum game (dark bars), and
mean number of points (out of 50) demanded in the recipient role of the ultimatum game (light bars). We compare the mean
difference between the number of points offered as the proposer and demanded as the recipient, in the ultimatum game. This
difference is significantly smaller for the VMPFC group compared with the two control groups (*p 0.05 and **p 0.01) Two
BDC subjects did not play the ultimatum games.
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groups, reflecting the large variance in performance seen in this
group. These results are consistent with our above findings that
the VMPFC patients displayed less guilt, although they raise the
possibility that impaired behavior on the Repay decision might
result from damage to structures other than the VMPFC as well.
Table 2 shows the results of the parametric analysis for guilt
and envy. As suggested by the previous literature and our results
from the individual game analyses, the VMPFC patients had sig-
nificantly lower  values than the comparison groups, indicating
that they were relatively insensitive to guilt. To make the  pa-
rameter more concrete, we can estimate a “betrayal point,” which
is the value of the temptation payoff T at which, according to the
estimated, a person would be just indifferent between choosing
Repay and Betray in the trust game [in the games in which the
Repay payoffs are R (40,40), the betrayal point is T() 40
(/4)]. Pure self-interest ( 0) would yield an inferred betrayal
point of 40 (because of complete indifference to the other player’s
payoff). Converting the estimated  parameters into betrayal
points we getT 47 for the VMPFC patients, lower than either of
the comparison groups (T 59 for BDC, and T 91 for NC).
A second finding from our analysis was that the  values for
the VMPFC group were statistically indistinguishable from the
comparison groups (possibly because of low statistical power and
issues with the envy estimation procedure, see supplemental
Methods, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental mate-
rial). This finding supports the idea that the VMPFC patients are
not diminished across the board on all emotions, as also sup-
ported by other studies (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007), but rather
show selective impairments on only certain social emotions.
The parameter estimates for the subjects’ beliefs about the
other players’ envy and guilt parameters, E() and E(), yielded
no significant differences between groups. This helps to rule out
the possibility that VMPFC patients behave anti-socially because
of unusual beliefs about the other players. Estimates of the re-
sponsiveness parameter  are similar across the groups and reas-
sure us that the different groups are not simply playing more or
less noisily.
Discussion
Social emotions such as guilt and envy can be either assessed from
subjects’ reports of their feelings or inferred from behavioral ob-
servation. Typically, VMPFC patients have poor insight into their
emotions, and behavioral observation in
the absence of a mathematical model
makes identification and interpretation of
the impaired processes problematic. Fur-
thermore, it is important to use actual de-
cisions since it has been shown that
VMPFC patients do not seem to be im-
paired in hypothetical decision making
(Leland and Grafman, 2005). Our battery
of simple economic tasks for the first time
shows quantitatively that patients with
damage to the VMPFC are abnormally insensitive to guilt but
suggests that they are not insensitive to envy.
There are lively debates in economics, psychology and cultural
anthropology about the nature of social behaviors (and their evo-
lutionary origins) (Wood and Grafman, 2003) and in cognitive
neuroscience about the neural basis of social emotions and the
role of the VMPFC (Berthoz et al., 2002; Moll et al., 2003; Taka-
hashi et al., 2004).
There is a large literature, primarily from functional imaging,
that implicates the medial prefrontal cortex in “theory-of-mind”
abilities; it is activated when we infer another person’s beliefs or
evaluate their personality (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Saxe and
Powell, 2006) or even when we think about the minds of animals
(Mitchell et al., 2005). Lesion studies have pointed in particular to
deficits in “affective” aspects of theory-of-mind, such as empa-
thy, irony, and social faux pas (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003, 2005),
suggesting that the prefrontal cortex contributes to social behav-
ior in part through the regulation of emotions, in particular social
emotions (Beer et al., 2003; Ochsner and Gross, 2005). Therefore,
VMPFC patients may be better viewed as dysfunctional in their
ability to regulate particular social emotions. Together with our
findings, these studies suggest that social emotions, such as guilt
and envy, may serve to bridge the gap between decision-making
in general, and social decisions, in particular. Future behavioral
studies, or those using neuroimaging, could use our guilt and
envy parameter estimates to make precise predictions about per-
formance, or regional brain activation, in other social decision-
making scenarios. Such studies could also benefit from a larger
battery of games and measures (such as eliciting beliefs) which
enable more precise estimation of guilt and envy parameters.
It is also interesting to compare our findings regarding im-
paired guilt with reports implicating VMPFC in processing regret
(Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005). Both guilt and regret
are distinguished from more basic emotions, like sadness or an-
ger, in that they cannot be derived solely from one’s own present
situation. In the case of guilt, the circumstances of another person
must be considered as well; in the case of regret, foregone out-
comes that might have been attained must be considered. Both of
these additional circumstances are abstract and require the adop-
tion of a point of view outside one’s own present circumstance. It
may be that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex contributes to
Table 1. Percentages (raw proportions) of Trust and Repay choices in trust games with different temptation values T and different Repay payoffs R
Investor: percent who chose Trust Trustee: percent who chose Repay
Group (N) T 45 T 60
T 60
R (30,30) T 100 Avg T 45 T 60
T 60
R (30,30) T 100 Avg
VMPFC (6) 50 (3/6) 50 (3/6) 50 (3/6) 33 (2/6) 46 (11/24) 33 (2/6) 33 (2/6) 17 (1/6) 0 (0/6) 21 (5/24)
BDC (17) 59 (10/17) 65 (11/17) 53 (9/17) 71 (12/17) 620.23 (42/68) 47 (8/17) 59 (10/17) 35 (6/17) 24 (4/17) 410.11 (28/68)
NC (16) 56 (9/16) 63 (10/16) 50 (8/16) 50 (8/16) 550.32 (35/64) 75 (12/16) 63 (10/16) 56 (9/16) 44 (7/16) 590.02 (38/64)
The Avg column simply adds up the Trust and Repay choices across the four games, giving the aggregate percentage (number) of Trust and Repay choices for each group. Superscripts are one-tailed t test p values between the VMPFC and
the row groups, treating each individual as a single data point. Epps–Singleton tests also yielded significant differences (p 0.05) between the VMPFC group and both comparison groups on the Avg Repay measure (see supplemental
Results, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
Table 2. Parameter estimates derived from the pooled dataset
Group (N) Guilt () Envy () Expected guilt E() Expected envy E() Group parameters
VMPFC (6) 27 (22) 8.5 (12) 98 (56) 472 (220) 0.23, 0.12
BDC (17) 750.06 (132) 00.21(5) 2700.29 (32) 6800.26 (170) 0.09, 0.13
NC (16) 2020.01 (107) 00.44 (8) 1600.38 (32) 4660.37 (165) 0.15, 0.12
Medianestimatedparameters for guilt, envy, expectedguilt, andexpectedenvy, aswell as twounique values estimated for eachgroupas awhole (guilt and
envy analyses, respectively). Superscripts are one-tailed t test p values between the VMPFC and the row groups, and numbers in parentheses are standard
errors; note that in both cases, these are based on themeans rather than the reportedmedians. See supplemental Table 2 (available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material) for precision estimates for the guilt estimation procedure.
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planning for the future for the same reason that it contributes to
negotiating interactions with other people: it mediates the elici-
tation of emotions based on outcomes that are not directly expe-
rienced, but imagined.
In conclusion, the data from our battery of economic games
point to a specific role in social behavior for the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex. Some of the hypotheses regarding the mecha-
nism by which damage to the vmPFC impairs social behavior are:
(1) that it grossly diminishes or abolishes all emotions; (2) that it
impairs complex theory-of-mind abilities but not emotions; (3)
that it specifically impairs a subset of social emotions. Our data
favor number (3) and argue for a relatively specific role regarding
guilt in the face of otherwise intact abilities to think about other
people (theory of mind) and ability to use other emotions, such as
envy (Koenigs and Tranel 2007). Whether or not feelings of guilt
(as opposed to their effects on motivation and behavior) are also
defective in VMPFC patients remains a challenging topic for fu-
ture study.
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